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Abstract
Net anthropogenic CO2 emissions must approach zero by mid-century to stabilize global mean 
temperature at the levels targeted by international efforts1–5. Yet continued expansion of fossil fuel 
energy infrastructure implies already ‘committed’ future CO2 emissions6–13. Here we use detailed 
datasets of current fossil fuel-burning energy infrastructure in 2018 to estimate regional and 
sectoral patterns of “committed” CO2 emissions, the sensitivity of such emissions to assumed 
operating lifetimes and schedules, and the economic value of associated infrastructure. We 
estimate that, if operated as historically, existing infrastructure will emit ~658 Gt CO2 (ranging 
from 226 to 1479 Gt CO2 depending on assumed lifetimes and utilization rates). More than half of 
these emissions are projected to come from the electricity sector, and infrastructure in China, the 
U.S.A., and the EU28 represent ~41%, ~9% and ~7% of the total, respectively. If built, proposed 
power plants (planned, permitted, or under construction) would emit an additional ~188 (37–427) 
Gt CO2. Committed emissions from existing and proposed energy infrastructure (~846 Gt CO2) 
thus represent more than the entire carbon budget to limit mean warming to 1.5 °C with 50–66% 
probability (420–580 Gt CO2)5, and perhaps two-thirds of the budget required to similarly limit 
warming to below 2 °C (1170–1500 Gt CO2)5. The remaining carbon budget estimates are varied 
and nuanced14,15, depending on the climate target and the availability of large-scale negative 
emissions16, Nevertheless, our emission estimates suggest that little or no additional CO2-emitting 
infrastructure can be commissioned, and that earlier than historical infrastructure retirements (or 
retrofits with carbon capture and storage technology) may be necessary, in order meet Paris 
climate agreement goals17. Based on asset value per ton of committed emissions, we estimate that 
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the most cost-effective premature infrastructure retirements will be in the electricity and industry 
sectors, if non-emitting alternative technologies are available and affordable4,18.
International efforts to limit the increase in global mean temperature to well below 2 °C and 
to “pursue efforts” to avoid 1.5 °C entail a transition to net-zero emissions energy systems 
by mid-century1–5. Yet recent decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of 
historically long-lived fossil fuel energy infrastructure, particularly associated with rapid 
economic development and industrialization of emerging markets such as China and 
India9,10 and a shift towards natural gas-fired power plants in the U.S. Although such 
expansion may be slowing19,20, substantial new electricity generating capacity is proposed
—and in many cases already under construction12. Consequently, there is a tension between 
dwindling carbon emissions budgets and future CO2 emissions locked-in or “committed” by 
existing and proposed energy infrastructure6,21,22.
A 2010 study estimated that operating fossil energy infrastructure would emit ~500 Gt CO2 
over its lifetime8. Subsequent studies estimated that existing power plants alone committed 
~300 Gt CO2 as of 2012 and 20169,12, and existing and proposed coal-fired power plants 
represented 340 Gt CO2 as of 201611 (Extended Data Table 1). Other studies have used 
integrated assessment models (IAMs) to assess the economic costs of “unlocking” emissions 
under stringent climate goals23,24, and to identify “points of no return” where no new 
infrastructure can be built without exceeding the 2°C target25. Most recently, Smith et al.13 
explored the potential climate responses to committed emissions, using a reduced-
complexity climate model and an idealized phase-out of fossil infrastructure to argue that 
aggressive mitigation of non-CO2 forcing could yet limit global warming to 1.5°C. However, 
it has been nearly a decade since a comprehensive bottom-up assessment of fossil 
infrastructure and committed emissions was made, during which years China’s economy has 
grown tremendously, there has been a global financial crisis and a natural gas boom in the 
U.S., and the Paris Agreement was ratified and entered into force. Substantial new fossil 
energy infrastructure has been commissioned over this time period, proposals of new power 
plants have waxed and waned, and climate mitigation efforts have grown more ambitious in 
many countries.
Here, we present region- and sector-specific estimates of future CO2 emissions related to 
fossil fuel-burning infrastructure existing and power plants proposed as of the end of 2018, 
as well as the sensitivity of such estimates to assumed lifetime and utilization rates, and the 
economic value of associated energy assets. Our analyses are based upon a compilation of 
the most detailed and up-to-date datasets of energy infrastructure available, as described in 
the Methods section. Our central estimates assume historical lifetimes (e.g., 40 years for 
power plants and industrial boilers, 15 years for a light-duty vehicle, etc.) and utilization 
rates (e.g., region- and fuel-specific power plant capacity factors, region-specific averages of 
vehicle fuel economy and annual kilometers traveled).
Figure 1 shows future CO2 emissions from existing and proposed energy and transportation 
infrastructure by sector (Fig. 1a) and country/region (Fig. 1b). We estimate that cumulative 
emissions by existing infrastructure, if operated as historically, will be 658 Gt CO2. Of this 
total commitment, 54% or 358 Gt CO2 is anticipated to come from existing electricity 
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infrastructure (mainly power plants), reflecting the large share of annual emissions from 
electricity infrastructure (46% in 2018) and the long historical lifetimes of generating 
infrastructure. Another 25% of the total, or 162 Gt CO2, is related to industrial 
infrastructure, and 10% or 64 Gt CO2 is related to the transportation sector (mainly on-road 
vehicles; Fig. 1a). This difference reveals the effect of infrastructure lifetimes: although 
industry and road transportation sectors have similar annual CO2 emissions (6.2 and 5.9 Gt 
CO2 in 2018, respectively), vehicle lifetimes are roughly a third as long as industrial capital. 
Finally, existing residential and commercial infrastructure represent 42 Gt CO2 and 18 Gt 
CO2 of all committed emissions, respectively.
Global committed emissions are now at the apex of a 20-year trend. Between 2002 to 2014, 
as China emerged as a global economic power, total committed emissions grew at an 
average annual rate of 9% per year (Extended Data Fig. 1a). Meanwhile, committed 
emissions related to infrastructure in the U.S. and EU28 have been shrinking since 2006 
(Extended Data Fig. 1c). Since 2014, the rate of infrastructural expansion in China and India 
has also fallen, and committed emissions in China declined by 7% between 2014 and 2018, 
even as committed emissions in the Rest of World have continued to climb (Extended Data 
Figs. 1a and 1c). These most recent trends may reflect nascent shifts in China’s economic 
structure19 and global trade20, and may be important harbingers of future changes in 
regions’ annual CO2 emissions9.
Figure 2 shows the age distribution of electricity generating units worldwide. Overall, the 
youth of fossil generating units worldwide is striking: 49% of the capacity now in operation 
worldwide was commissioned after 2004, and this share is 79% and 69% in China and India, 
respectively. The average age of coal-fired power plants operating in China and India (11.1 
and 12.2 years, respectively) is thus much lower than those in the U.S. and the EU28 (39.6 
and 32.8 years, respectively; Fig. 2b), with correspondingly longer remaining lifetimes. The 
predominance of young Chinese infrastructure (which extends to the industrial and 
transportation sectors; Extended Data Figs. 2 and 3) reflects the scale and speed of the 
country’s industrialization and urbanization since the turn of the century. As a result, 
infrastructural inertia is greatest in China, accounting for 41% of all committed emissions 
(270 Gt CO2; Fig. 1b). In comparison, infrastructure in India, the U.S., and the EU28 
represents much smaller commitments: 57 Gt, 57 Gt, and 49 Gt CO2, respectively (Fig. 1b; 
Table S1 in Supporting Information).
In addition to existing infrastructure, new power plants are being planned, permitted, or 
constructed, and the committed emissions related to such proposed plants may be 
estimated11,12. As of the end of 2018, the best-available data showed 579 GW, 583 GW, and 
40 GW of coal-, gas-, and oil-fired generating capacity were proposed to be built over the 
next several years, respectively (~20% of it in China; Fig. 2). If built and operated as 
historically, this proposed capacity would represent an additional 188 Gt CO2 committed: 97 
Gt CO2 from coal-, 91 Gt CO2 from gas-, oil-, and other-fuel-fired generating units (Table 
S2).
Tong et al. Page 3
Nature. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 February 01.
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
Together, committed emissions from existing infrastructure and proposed power plants total 
846 Gt CO2 if all proposed plants are built and all infrastructure operated as historically 
(Fig. 1).
Existing electricity and industry infrastructure accounts for 79% of total committed 
emissions if operated as historically (i.e. with a 40-year lifetime and 53% utilization rate; 
Fig. 1a). However, the lifetime and operation of such infrastructure will ultimately depend 
on the relative costs of competing technologies, in turn influenced by factors such as 
technological progress and the climate and energy policies in each region22,26. Figure 3 
highlights the sensitivity of committed emissions (Figs. 3a and 3b) and the rate of annual 
emissions reductions (Figs. 3c and 3d; see Methods) to the assumed lifetime and utilization 
rates (i.e. capacity factors) of industry and electricity infrastructure (n.b. lifetimes and 
operation of infrastructure in other sectors are not varied from historical averages), with the 
star in each panel indicating historical average values. For example, total committed 
emissions related to existing infrastructure decrease to ~200 Gt CO2 if lifetimes are and 
capacity factors decrease to 20 years and 20%, respectively, but increase to almost 1500 Gt 
CO2 if lifetimes and capacity factors increase to 60 years and 80%, respectively (Fig. 3a). 
These ranges of lifetimes and utilization are quite wide, at the low end probably exceeding 
economic feasibility for recouping capital investments and covering fixed operating and 
maintenance costs. When proposed power plants are included, total committed emissions 
over the same range of lifetimes and capacity factors increase to 263–1906 Gt CO2 (Fig. 3b). 
Maintaining historical capacity factors, a 5-year difference in the lifetime of existing 
infrastructure represents roughly 70–100 Gt of future CO2 emissions (Fig. 3a), or about 90–
130 Gt if proposed power plants are included (Fig. 3b). Maintaining historical lifetime and 
changing the assumed capacity factor by a comparable 9% (e.g., from 46% to 55%) results 
in roughly the same changes in committed emissions, suggesting these factors have a similar 
influence.
For comparison, the hatched red and orange zones in Figures 3a and 3b show the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) most recent estimated ranges of 
remaining cumulative carbon budgets spanning 50% to 66% probabilities of limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C and 2°C relative to the preindustrial era5. Excluding proposed power 
plants, our central estimate of committed emissions (658 Gt CO2; star in Fig. 3a) exceeds the 
range of the remaining 1.5°C budget (420–580 Gt CO2)5. When proposed plants are 
included, our estimate of committed emissions (846 Gt CO2; star in Fig. 3b) is two-thirds of 
the lower estimates of the 2°C budgets (1170–1500 Gt CO2)5. This suggests that, unless 
compensated by negative emissions technologies or retrofitted with carbon capture and 
storage, 1.5°C carbon budgets allow for no new emitting infrastructure and require 
substantial changes to the lifetime or operation of already existing energy infrastructure 
(e.g., decreasing lifetimes to <25 years or capacity factors to <30%; Fig. 3a). Moreover, CO2 
emissions related to the extraction and transport of fossil fuels27 and non-energy CO2 
emissions (e.g., due to land use change)28 are not included in our estimates and will further 
reduce the remaining carbon budgets.
Climate targets have also sometimes been contextualized by the annual rate of emissions 
reduction they imply. For example, Raupach et al.29 showed, as of 2013, the cumulative 
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carbon budgets likely to avoid 2°C of mean warming implied necessary average annual 
reductions in global CO2 emissions (i.e. mitigation rates) of ~6% per year. The hatched areas 
in Figures 3c and 3d show that such mitigation rates, recalculated from the latest carbon 
budgets, are about 5% per year for the 2°C budgets (4.5–5.7%) and about 13% per year for 
1.5°C budgets (11.4–15.7%). In comparison, the contours in the figure show mitigation rates 
if no new emitting infrastructure is commissioned (10.1%; star in Fig. 3c) or only proposed 
power plants but no other emitting infrastructure is commissioned (7.9%; star in Fig. 3d). 
Again the international targets leave little or no room for new infrastructure if existing plants 
operate as they have historically (stars) unless fully compensated by negative emissions or 
retrofitted with carbon capture and storage technologies.
Given the constraints of 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets, we also explore the economic value 
of existing infrastructure relative to its associated committed emissions. Figure 4a highlights 
the disproportionality of committed emissions per unit asset value. Together power and 
industry infrastructure (purple and dark blue in Fig. 4a, respectively) represent >75% of total 
committed emissions (519 of 658 Gt CO2) but <25% of the estimated economic value of 
CO2-emitting energy infrastructure (~$5 trillion of $22 trillion; Extended Data Fig. 4; Table 
S3; see Methods for details of how asset values were amortized). In contrast, transportation 
infrastructure, with shorter average lifetimes but high capacity costs and a vast number of 
discrete units, represents roughly two-thirds of the value of emitting assets and less than 
10% of committed emissions (Fig. 4a). This analysis suggests that efforts to reduce 
committed emissions might cost-effectively target early retirement of electricity and industry 
infrastructure—despite their often powerful influence on policy and institutions6,21,22—if 
non-emitting alternative technologies are affordable: the magnitude of commitments in these 
sectors is large and a single dollar of asset value is related to >10 kg of future CO2 emissions 
(Fig. 4b; red rectangle). Industry and electricity sectors in China represent especially prime 
targets for unlocking future emissions: nearly half (46%) of these sectors’ committed 
emissions are associated with Chinese infrastructure (Fig. 4a).
Detailed and up-to-date analysis of existing and proposed CO2-emitting energy 
infrastructure worldwide reveals incredibly tight constraints of current international climate 
targets even if no new emitting-infrastructure is ever built. Although climate and energy 
analysts have emphasized that avoiding 1.5°C of warming, for example, remains 
“technically possible”5, our results lend vivid context to that possibility: we would have a 
reasonable chance of achieving the 1.5°C target with (1) a global prohibition of all new 
CO2-emitting devices—including many or most of the already proposed fossil fuel-burning 
power plants, and (2) substantial reductions in the historical lifetimes and/or utilization rates 
of already existing industry and electricity infrastructure.
Barring such radical changes, the global climate goals adopted in the Paris Agreement are 
already in jeopardy and may be contingent upon widespread retrofitting of existing emitting 
infrastructure with carbon capture and storage technologies (which retrofits would be 
tremendously expensive30), large-scale deployment of negative emissions technologies16, 
and/or solar radiation management4. On the other hand, our results suggest that the level of 
future warming in excess of the Paris targets is largely dependent on infrastructure that has 
not been built yet (Extended Data Fig. 5).
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Some important caveats and limitations apply to our findings. The trajectory of future 
emissions depicted in Figure 1 represents a scenario in which existing (and proposed) 
emitting infrastructure “ages out,” and no new emitting infrastructure is ever commissioned. 
These constraints are not intended as realistic; rather, they allow us to isolate and quantify 
infrastructural—and related economic—lock-in of energy-related emissions22. Indeed, 
technological trends and climate-energy policies that encourage growth in renewable 
electricity (e.g., solar and wind) may lead to earlier than historical retirements of existing 
fossil fuel power plants in some regions, although recent growth of renewable generation has 
not always displaced fossil generation18. It is also instructive to compare our estimates of 
committed emissions to plausible energy-emissions scenarios generated by much more 
sophisticated (but less transparent) IAMs that calculate infrastructure lifetimes and capacity 
factors endogenously. For example, a recent IAM study of 1.5°C scenarios found that large-
scale carbon dioxide removal may be necessary to compensate for “residual” emissions from 
long-lived and difficult-to-decarbonize sectors of the energy system (e.g., freight, aviation, 
and shipping4)31.
The size of carbon budgets associated with a given temperature target is also a complicated 
matter that is sensitive to a host of factors such as climate sensitivity and non-CO2 
emissions14,15. The budgets from the recent IPCC Special Report are estimates of 
cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from the start of 2018 until net-zero 
global CO2 emissions are achieved (i.e. climate is stabilized) with a 50–66% probability of 
limiting an increase of mean near-surface air temperatures to 1.5°C or 2°C with limited 
(<0.1°C) or no overshoot5 (see Methods for further discussion).
Although ambitious climate targets such as 1.5°C may help to motivate and accelerate the 
transition toward net-zero energy systems, their feasibility is often evaluated by the existence 
of consistent scenarios from IAMs. However, these models have been used to analyze a very 
large possibility space, and some scenarios may thus reflect aspirational trajectories of 
energy demand or technological progress and scale whose likelihood may be difficult to 
evaluate32,33. Our data-driven assessment of existing, operating, and valuable energy 
infrastructure may therefore help to elucidate the infrastructural and economic implications 
of such targets, and also help to identify targeted regional and sectoral opportunities for 
unlocking future CO2 emissions.
Methods
Committed emissions from existing and proposed infrastructure
We extend the approach of Davis et al9 to quantify the committed emissions from existing 
energy infrastructure by integrating more detailed and up-to-date data of energy 
infrastructure available, including country- and duty-specific vehicle sales data, and unit-
level details of global power plants and Chinese cement kilns and blast furnaces10,34–39. We 
also estimate committed emission from proposed power plants by collecting all proposed 
power generators from the latest available databases34,37, in recognition of substantial 
changes in the pipeline of planned power plants (especially coal) in recent years34. Energy 
infrastructure as quantified in this study is categorized into eight sectors: (1) electricity, (2) 
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industry, (3) road transport, (4) other transport, (5) international transport, (6) residential, (7) 
commercial and (8) other energy infrastructure (see Tables S4 and S5).
Electricity infrastructure
Emissions from electricity infrastructure in this study include all emissions under category 
1A1 of the IPCC’s Revised Guidelines40. Electricity infrastructure here mainly includes 
main activity electricity and heat production (1A1a), and petroleum refining (1A1b), as well 
as manufacturing of solid fuels and other energy industries (1A1c) (Table S5).
Emissions intensities.—Previously, we built and published a comprehensive global 
thermal power plants database in 2010 (named GPED) by integrating high-quality national 
databases (China, India, and the U.S.)10. Here we update the GPED database to the year 
2018 (named GPED-2018) using the latest power plant database from China (CPED)36 and 
the Platts World Electric Power Plant (WEPP) database for other regions37, including all 
retired and operating units through the end of 2018. We obtain data and estimates of unit-
based CO2 emission intensity (i.e. gCO2/kwh) for all units that were operating in 2010 from 
GPED-2010. For units retired prior to 2010 or commissioned since 2010, we estimate unit-
level CO2 emission intensity by the methods of Davis et al9 based on the Carbon Monitoring 
for Action (CARMA) database35 (for older units) or else use national or regional average 
CO2 emission intensity for units with the same fuel type and similar nameplate capacity. As 
prior studies have done, we assume these emissions intensities are constant over a unit’s 
lifetime8,9.
Assumed lifetime.—In the resulting GPED-2018, global average lifetimes of retired 
coal-, nature gas-, and oil-fired power units is 35.9, 37.1, and 33.9 years, respectively. 
Consistent with prior study9 have done, we simplify these ranges to a single reference 
lifetime of 40 years for all electricity-generating units for our “as historically” case, and 
show the sensitivity of committed emissions to this assumption in Figure 3. When units 
already operating beyond their assumed lifetime, these units are randomly retired over the 
next 5 years in order to avoid unrealistically abrupt changes in emissions between 2018 and 
2019.
In addition, we assume that the age structure and lifetime of autoproducers (industrial and 
commercial facilities which generate their own electricity on-site)40 and other energy 
industries are similar to the main activity power plants in each region. Therefore, committed 
emissions from existing electricity infrastructure are quantified by employing the survival 
curves derived from main activity power plants, scaled to include these other types of 
electricity infrastructure using country-level electricity emissions totals in 2018 from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). It is noted that the country-level CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustions for 2018 were derived from multiplying country-level CO2 
emissions in 2016 by projected change rates during 2016–2018 due to data availability41.
Finally, we quantify the cumulative future CO2 emissions from proposed power plants by 
the same procedure (assuming historical average unitization rates and lifetimes) using a 
database of proposed coal-fired units that has been developed by CoalSwarm34 and the 
planned units fired with other fossil fuels from the Q4 2018 WEPP database37.
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Industry infrastructure
Industrial emissions in this study include all emissions under category 1A2 of the IPCC’s 
Revised Guidelines40. For all countries but China, we estimate cumulative future emissions 
from industry infrastructure using country-level emissions data for the year 2018 obtained 
from the IEA and assuming that the age distribution and survival curves of each region’s 
industry infrastructure is consistent with its electricity infrastructure. To derive China’s 
industrial survival curves, we use unit-level details of cement kilns and blast furnaces (iron 
& steel) currently operating in China (Extended Data Fig. 2), obtained from China’s 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) (unpublished data, hereinafter refer to as the 
MEE database).
The detailed data of Chinese infrastructure represent an important improvement in the 
current study over prior estimates of committed emissions, as we China alone accounts for 
~47% of total industrial emissions41. In particular, the iron/steel and non-metallic minerals 
(e.g., cement and glass) industries account for ~50% of all industrial CO2 emissions in 
recent years41, and China produced 49.6% of the world’s raw steel and 57.3% of the world’s 
cement in 201642. The unit-level data of China’s industrial infrastructure thus substantially 
decreases uncertainty of committed industry emissions by alleviating the need for 
assumptions related to almost half of global industry infrastructure (i.e. 9.0% of global CO2 
emissions from all sources41). Moreover, we observed that the age distributions of electricity 
and industry infrastructure in China are quite similar (Extended Data Fig. 6), which lends 
support to our assumption that this is the case in other regions where we lack detailed data of 
industrial infrastructure.
Transportation infrastructure
Transport emissions in this study include all emissions under category 1A3 of the IPCC’s 
Revised Guidelines40, which includes emissions from road transport, other transport and 
international transport (Tables S4 and S5).
Cumulative future emissions from road transport were calculated following the approach in 
Davis et al.8 and further updating the activity rates with updated country-, region-, and duty-
specific vehicle sales data38,39 (i.e. 18% of global CO2 emissions from all sources41). 
Specifically, we use the number, class, and vintage of motor vehicles sold during 1977–2017 
from 40 major countries and regions38,39 (information for 2018 was derived by projecting 
2016–2017 rates of change one additional year; Extended Data Fig. 3). We then estimate the 
number of vehicles remaining on the road over time using class- and model year-specific 
survival rates of U.S. and Chinese vehicles to represent developed and developing countries 
or regions due to data availability, respectively43,44. We then calculate annual vehicle 
emissions based on the average miles driven per year (MPY) per vehicles by class and 
carbon emission factors of 10.23 and 11.80 kg CO2 per gallon of gas and diesel, 
respectively, and scale our estimated emissions to match country-level road transport 
emissions in 2018 as reported by the IEA41.
“Other transportation” infrastructure includes existing aviation, rail, pipeline, navigation and 
other non-specified transport. International transport infrastructure includes international 
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marine bunkers and international aviation bunkers in this work (Table S4). Again, we follow 
Davis et al.8, estimating cumulative future CO2 emissions from existing other and 
international transport using country-level emissions data of 2018 from IEA, and assuming 
lifetimes and age distributions similar to motor vehicle fleets in each country/region.
Residential, commercial and other energy infrastructure
Residential and commercial emissions are included under category 1A4 of the IPCC’s 
Revised Guidelines40, and “Other energy” emissions include, e.g., emissions from 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, and aquaculture under category 1A4 as well as and stationary, 
mobile, and multilateral operations under category 1A5 of the IPCC’s Revised Guidelines. 
Cumulative future emissions from this infrastructure were calculated using country-level 
emissions data of 2018 derived from the IEA41, and assuming age distributions and lifetimes 
of residential, commercial and other energy infrastructure in each region were similar to 
electricity infrastructure in the same region in the absence of better information.
The least-supported methodological assumptions we make thus concern this residential, 
commercial and other energy infrastructure (~10% of total fossil fuel CO2 emissions in 
201641), where we lack any unit-level data. In order to test the sensitivity of total committed 
emissions from this infrastructure, we performed additional analyses of different assumed 
lifetimes. We found the committed emissions from residential, commercial, and other energy 
infrastructure are 29, 74, and 135 Gt CO2 when lifetimes of 20, 40, and 60 years are 
assumed, respectively (Extended Data Fig. 7). That is, our estimates of total committed 
emissions from all existing energy infrastructure decrease by 7% (to 613 Gt CO2) if 
lifetimes of residential, commercial, and other energy infrastructure are assumed to be 20 
years, and increase by 9% (to 719 Gt CO2) if the lifetimes are assumed to be 60 years. In 
comparison to the carbon budgets associated with targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C, these are 
relatively small effects, and not substantial enough to affect the main conclusions of our 
study.
Comparison of cumulative future emissions estimates
Other studies have analyzed committed emissions of various infrastructure in different ways, 
as mentioned in the text and summarized in Extended Data Table 18,9,11–13.
For example, both Edenhofer et al.11 and Pfeiffer et al.12 reported committed emissions 
related to existing and planned power plants using 2016 data. Although the latter analyzed 
committed emissions of all fossil electricity infrastructure12, the former focused particularly 
on coal-fired units11. Importantly, the 2018 data used in the current study reveals that 
substantial cancellations of proposed plants have occurred over the intervening two years: 
whereas the previous studies estimated ~150 Gt CO2 and 210 Gt CO2 were committed by 
proposed coal plants, we estimate only ~100 Gt CO2, 50–100 Gt CO2 less, respectively (or 
10–20% of the remaining carbon budget consistent with 1.5°C, respectively). Moreover, our 
study contains more detailed estimates of regional commitments and the sensitivity of these 
commitments to assumed lifetime and capacity factor.
Most recently, Smith et al.13 estimated the global warming related to committed emissions 
using a reduced-complexity climate model (FaIR). Their study also included estimates of 
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committed emissions from all sectors, but these relied on past estimates of the age 
distribution of fossil fuel infrastructure and an idealized, linear phase-out of such 
infrastructure13. Because turnover of infrastructure has decreased the median age of 
electricity generating capacity in many regions (Fig. 2), our estimates of electric power 
sector commitments (358 Gt CO2) are ~13 Gt CO2 greater than those used by Smith et al13 
(345 Gt CO2). Our data-driven approach also permits region-specific results, analysis of the 
trend in commitments over time, inclusion of proposed power plants, and an assessment of 
the economic value of underlying infrastructures. Yet, because Smith et al.’s estimates of 
CO2 emissions committed by other infrastructure are larger than our bottom-up estimates 
(Extended Data Table 1), the overall estimate reached by their idealized approach (715 Gt 
CO2) is nonetheless similar to that of the current study (658 Gt CO2).
In turn, Smith et al.13 assess the global climate responses to the committed CO2 and 
conclude that the world is not yet committed to 1.5°C13. However, it is difficult to directly 
compare the magnitude of the CO2 emissions in Smith et al.’s phase-out scenarios with the 
SR1.5 carbon budgets for two reasons: First, although SR1.5 also used the FaIR model in its 
procedure of evaluating non-CO2 forcing, it did not use the FaIR model’s transient climate 
response to cumulative emissions (TCRE), which is smaller and would have led to 
considerably larger carbon budgets. Second, the mitigation scenarios evaluated by Smith et 
al. also assumed that non-CO2 emissions are completely phased out in parallel to CO2, while 
the integrated assessment model scenarios on which the SR1.5 report’s non-CO2 forcing 
(and carbon budgets) are based do not completely eliminate non-CO2 emissions this 
century45.
Variation of utilization rates and assumed lifetimes
As described above, cumulative future committed emissions from electricity and industry 
infrastructure depend on utilization rates and assumed lifetimes. The longer the assumed 
lifetime and higher the utilization, the greater the estimate of committed emissions will be. 
In this study, we therefore test the sensitivity of committed emissions to assumed lifetimes 
and utilization rates of energy and industry infrastructure across lifetimes from 20 to 60 
years and utilization rates of 20% to 80%.
Remaining carbon budgets to limit mean warming to 1.5 and 2 °C
As described in the text and discussed in recent literature, the size of carbon budgets 
associated with a given temperature target is a complicated matter that is sensitive to a host 
of factors14,15, including (1) whether the budget reflects cumulative net emissions until the 
temperature target is exceeded or cumulative net emissions that limits global temperature 
increase to below the target (i.e. climate is stabilized), (2) whether there can be a temporary 
overshoot of the temperature target (and by how much)46, (3) the climate responses to CO2 
and non-CO2 forcings47, (4) the magnitude and Earth system response to negative 
emissions48, (5) how global temperature is calculated, (6) the pre-industrial baseline used49, 
(7) whether Earth system feedbacks such as permafrost thawing are included50–53, and (8) 
future emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols54,55.
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The magnitude of non-CO2 forcing is particularly relevant to assessments of committed 
emissions because non-CO2 forcing is inversely related to the remaining carbon budget54,55, 
and because some non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols are directly related to the current 
energy system (e.g., fugitive methane56) or are co-emitted with CO2 by fossil fuel-burning 
infrastructure. Other large sources of non-CO2 gases and aerosols exist outside of the energy 
system, such as agriculture57. For the SR1.5 budgets, non-CO2 forcing was estimated using 
integrated assessment model scenarios and a pair of reduced-complexity climate models 
(MAGICC and FaIR), with substantial uncertainties associated with both scenario variations 
(±250 Gt CO2) and climate responses (-400 to 200 Gt CO2) for the 1.5°C budget5. Non-CO2 
greenhouse gases and aerosols decline but do not reach zero in any of the scenarios assessed 
by the SR1.5 report. In contrast, the recent study by Smith et al. modeled the complete 
phase-out of non-CO2 emissions in parallel with energy-related CO2 emissions, a formidable 
scenario that was found to have a high probability (64%) of limiting warming to 1.5°C13.
In this study, we compare our estimates of committed emissions to the SR1.5 budgets5. As 
defined by the recent SR1.5 report, remaining carbon budgets are the cumulative net global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions from a given start date (January 1, 2018) to the year in which 
such emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting global 
warming to a given level5. By this definition, budgets are not simply cumulative emissions 
until the time when mean temperature exceeds a given threshold14, but rather what have 
been called “threshold avoidance” or called “stabilization” budgets. The SR1.5 budgets were 
derived from the transient climate response to cumulative CO2 emissions in climate model 
simulations that have been further adjusted to include additional climate forcing related to 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols45. They do not include Earth system feedbacks 
(which the report suggests could reduce the remaining budgets by 100 Gt CO2 over the 
century).
However, as remaining budgets associated with mean surface warming of 1.5°C dwindle, 
uncertainties in transient climate response to CO2 emissions15,47 and the current and future 
non-CO2 forcing loom large53–55. In order to make our results as useful, transparent, and 
comparable as possible, we report positive, CO2-only commitments from existing and 
proposed fossil fuel-burning infrastructure and compare to these to the remaining 
(stabilization) carbon budgets reported by the SR1.5 report to give a 50–66% probability of 
limiting warming to 1.5°C and 2°C with little (0.1°C) or no overshoot: 420–580 Gt CO2 and 
1170–1500 Gt CO2, respectively (See Table 2.2 in ref.5). Thus, if not offset by negative 
emissions, the total committed emissions we estimate if existing infrastructure operates as it 
has historically (i.e. 658 Gt CO2) would make it likely that global temperatures will exceed 
1.5°C unless the remaining carbon budgets in the SR1.5 are substantially wrong. For 
example, the climate response to CO2 could be less than expected based on the climate 
model simulations the SR1.5 assessed and/or non-CO2 forcing in the future could be much 
less than it is on average in the integrated assessment model scenarios that were assessed by 
the SR1.5. Indeed, Smith et al.13 analyzed a future where both are true.
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Estimates of the annual rate of emission reductions
We estimate annual rate of emissions reduction (“mitigation rates”) following Raupach et al 
(2014)29:
f t = f 0 1 + r + m t
where f(t) is the emissions at time t, f0 is the emissions at the start of mitigation (t = 0), r is 
an initially linear growth rate, and r and m both have units of per year. When the necessary 
annual rate of emission reductions to meet quota q from t=0 onward (with emission time T = 
q/f0), we estimate the annual rate of emission reductions, m, as:
m q =
1 + 1 + rq/ f 0
q/ f 0
= 1 + 1 + r /TT
We use initial emissions f0 at 2018 and growth rates r averaged over 2013–2018. Therefore, 
f0= 32.7 Gt and r = 0.028% used obtained from IEA41 when estimating mitigation rates 
under different cumulative CO2 emissions, which we assumed to be equivalent to the carbon 
quota, q.
Estimates of asset value from existing infrastructure
We estimate the asset value by sector and by country/region using the following equation:
AVi, s = ∑
n = PY − LT
PY
∑
y
TCi,  s, n, y × CCi,  s, n, y × 1 − RV × DRi, s, n, y + RV
where i, s, n, y represents country/region, sector, years, and combustion/production 
technology, AV represents asset value, TC represents equivalent total capacity, CC 
represents capital costs, RV represents the ratio of residual value, and 5% is applied for all 
the infrastructure; DR represents depreciation rate, PY represents present year, referring 
2018 in this study.LT represents lifetimes.
We adopt sector-dependent method, and apply straight-line and geometric models for 
different infrastructure, as shown in Table S6. Data on capital costs used to estimate the asset 
value was collected from previous literature12,21,23–25,58,59 and various reports60–64. 
Wherever possible, we use interannual and national average capital costs for different 
combustion/production technology and equipment. Where an interannual and national 
averages were not available, we instead use an average of all the countries in the same region 
where capital cost data were available.
Electricity infrastructure
We estimate the total value of fossil fuel electricity-generating assets according to each 
unit’s power generating capacity (kW) and age, as well as fuel- and technology-specific 
capital costs ($/kW).
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The assumed lifetime of coal power plants is 40 years. Although plants can operate for 
considerably longer periods, shutting down a plant after its assumed lifetime will not result 
in any stranded capital investment since the initial capital cost will have been fully paid24. 
Thus, our estimates only include the asset value of operating electricity-generating units that 
are now less than 40 years old. Unit-level details of electricity-generating technologies were 
obtained from GPED-2018 database.
In addition, part of committed CO2 emissions in electricity infrastructure are from heating 
plants. The asset value of combined heat and power (CHP) plants have been evaluated along 
with other power plants, but we estimate the asset value of individual heating plants 
separately, using IEA data on heating output (TJ)65,66 to estimate the capacity of such 
heating plants and converting this to an equivalent power capacity (GW) assuming they 
operate with the average utilization rates of power generating units in the same region. Table 
S6 summarizes the assumptions of estimating asset value of individual heating plants.
Industrial infrastructure
Industrial infrastructure includes various facilities and systems from different sub-industrial 
sectors (Tables S4 and S5). Considering the difficulty of collecting the operating capacity for 
all the sub-industrial sectors, we estimate the value of industry infrastructure as the 
combined asset values of cement, iron and steel plants, and industrial boilers. As described 
above, only the asset value for cement, iron and steel capacity operating less than 40 years 
was estimated in this work. Asset value from cement, iron and steel industry are quantified 
through total capacity and capital investment per unit (Table S6).
We estimate total capacities (t/h) of industrial boilers at country- or region-level by fuel type 
by through total energy consumptions obtained from IEA65,66. The utilization rates of 
industrial boilers are assumed to be the same as the average utilization rate of electricity 
infrastructure. The related assumptions are shown in Table S6.
Transport infrastructure
We quantify the value from road transport, other transport and international transport assets 
separately. For road transport infrastructure, we estimate asset value by number of annual 
vehicle sales, annual average new car prices, and a depreciation rate function. The data 
sources of number of annual vehicle sales is described above, and we further collect annual 
average new car prices by vehicle type and country/region39. Because depreciation rates tend 
to be considerably lower in developing countries than industrialized countries67, we adopt 
different depreciation rate functions for developing and developed countries67.
For international transport infrastructure, we estimate the value of international ships and 
international airplanes. Due to limited data availability, we use the same approach as with 
heating infrastructure, basing our estimates on the total energy consumption (fuels) for 
international aviation and international navigation from the IEA, and converting to the 
number of reference narrow-body aircraft and standardized international freight ships by 
such fuel consumption. Specifically, we assume 2 million-km/year per aircraft and 149 MJ/
airplane-km for reference narrow-body aircrafts21 (Table S6); 940 million annual ton-km 
and an average ship energy intensity of 0.125 MJ/ton-km for international freight ships21. 
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We use the same total average depreciation rates for international transport as we do for road 
transport infrastructure.
We use a similar approach for other transport (i.e. domestic ships, domestic airplanes, and 
non-specific transport), adopting the same assumptions applied in the international transport 
for domestic ships and domestic airplanes. For non-specific transport, we quantify asset 
values by converting to the number of conventional diesel heavy-duty freight truck. The 
corresponding assumptions are shown in Table S6.
Residential, commercial and other energy infrastructure
We quantify the asset values of residential, commercial and other energy infrastructure 
separately using sector- and fuel-specific energy consumption data from the IEA65,66.
Residential and commercial infrastructure use energy for space heating, heating water, and 
cooking. Other energy infrastructure includes uses of energy for agriculture, fishing and 
other activities. Given very limited data, we quantify the value of residential and commercial 
infrastructure by according to an equivalent capacity of normalized space heating units, 
water heating units, and cooking equipment. In the other energy infrastructure, we quantified 
the asset value by converting to normalized agriculture machines, fishing boats and boilers. 
We then apply the total average depreciation rates of electricity infrastructure to these 
residential, commercial and other energy infrastructures.
Uncertainty estimated
Our estimates of asset values are subject to uncertainty due to incomplete knowledge of 
operating capacities, their age structure, and the capital costs per unit. In order to more 
completely assess uncertainties in our results, we perform a Monte Carlo analysis of asset 
values by sector and by country/region in which we vary key parameters according to ranges 
in the literature58,68,69 and collected capital costs data above. The error bars shown in Figure 
4 depict the results of this analysis, showing the lower and upper bounds of a 95% 
confidence interval (CI) around our central estimate. The Monte Carlo simulation uses 
specified probability distributions for each input parameter (e.g., capital cost per unit, and 
the ratio of residual value) to generate random variables68. The probability distribution of 
asset value is estimated according to a set of runs (n=10,000) in a Monte Carlo framework 
with probability distributions of the input parameters. The ranges of sector- and -region-
parameter values vary in part due to the quality of their statistical infrastructure69. Table S7 
summarizes the probability distributions of the asset value estimation-related parameters.
Data availability
The numerical results plotted in Figures 1–4 are provided with the manuscript. Our analysis 
relies on six different datasets, each used with permission and/or by license. Five are 
available from their original creators: (1) the GPED database: http://www.meicmodel.org/
dataset-gped.html, (2) Platt’s WEPP database: https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/products-
services/electric-power/world-electric-power-plants-database, (3) the CARMA database: 
http://carma.org/, (4) the CoalSwarm database: https://endcoal.org/tracker/, and (5) vehicle 
sales data: https://www.statista.com/markets/419/topic/487/vehicles-road-traffic/. The sixth 
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dataset includes unit-level data of Chinese iron, steel and cement infrastructure which we 
obtained directly from the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment. We do not have 
permission to share the raw data, but we provide it in an aggregated form (Extended Data 
Figure 2).
Extended Data
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Extended Data Figure 1 |. Changes in remaining commitments from existing energy 
infrastructure.
Estimates of future CO2 emissions every four years by industry sector (a) and country/region 
(b) from 1998 to 2018 (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018), assuming historical 
lifetimes and utilization rates. Panels (c) and (d) show corresponding changes in remaining 
commitments by industry sector (c) and country/region (d).
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Extended Data Figure 2 |. Age structure of Chinese major industrial capacity.
The operating capacity of raw steel in iron and steel industry (a) and clinker in cement 
industry (b) where the youngest units are at the bottom.
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Extended Data Figure 3 |. Age structure of currently road transport infrastructure.
This figure shows the population of vehicle sales by country/region.
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Extended Data Figure 4 |. Asset value and committed emissions of existing infrastructure.
Cumulative committed CO2 emissions in the order of committed emission per value (kg 
CO2 per $) (from high to low) by country/region and sector. Dash horizontal lines indicate 
50%, 75% and 90% of total committed emissions if operated as historically, respectively.
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Extended Data Figure 5 |. Annual emissions from existing, proposed and future infrastructure.
This figure shows historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuel energy infrastructure (black 
area), and future CO2 emissions from existing (red area) and proposed energy infrastructure 
(dark red area), as well as future infrastructure (dark grey area) under representative 
concentration pathways (RCPs: RCP8.5, RCP6, RCP4.5, and RCP2.6).
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Extended Data Figure 6 |. Survival curves of power and major industries in China.
This figure shows survival curves of power sector (peachblow line), cement industry (orange 
line), and iron and steel industry (blue line) in China under the assumption of 40-year 
lifetimes.
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Extended Data Figure 7 |. Annual emissions from residential, commercial, and other energy 
infrastructure.
This figure shows future annual CO2 emissions from residential, commercial, and other 
energy infrastructure under the assumptions of 20- (peachblow line), 40- (orange line), and 
60-year (blue line) lifetimes.
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Figure 1 |. Committed CO2 emissions from existing and proposed energy infrastructure.
Estimates of future CO2 emissions by industry sector (a; see also Tables S1 and S2) and 
country/region (b), assuming historical lifetimes and utilization rates. Emissions from 
existing infrastructure are shown by darker shading, and emissions from proposed power 
plants (i.e. electricity) are more lightly shaded.
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Figure 2 |. Age structure of global electricity-generating capacity.
The operating capacity of gas- and oil-fired electricity-generating units (a) and coal-fired 
units (b) where the youngest units are at the bottom. Lighter shaded bars at the bottom show 
proposed electricity-generating units according to the year they are expected to be 
commissioned. Recent trends in Chinese and Indian coal-fired units (red and orange at lower 
right, respectively) and U.S. gas-fired units (green at left) is apparent. Note that 0 years old 
means the power units began operating in 2018.
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Figure 3 |. Sensitivity of committed emissions (a, b) and mitigation rates (c, d) to utilization rates 
and assumed lifetimes.
Contours show estimates of committed emissions related to existing infrastructure (a) and 
existing infrastructure and proposed power plants (b) when the assumed lifetimes and 
utilization rates of electricity and industry infrastructure are varied from 20–60 years 20–
80%, respectively. Across the same ranges of lifetime and utilization, corresponding annual 
rates of emission reduction span from 3% to 30% (c and d). Hatched orange and red zones 
indicate carbon budgets and mitigation rates likely to limit mean warming to 1.5°C and 2°C, 
respectively (see Methods), and stars denote committed emissions and mitigation rates if 
existing/and proposed infrastructure is operated as historically.
Tong et al. Page 29
Nature. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 February 01.
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
N
ASA A
uthor M
an
u
script
Figure 4 |. Asset value and committed emissions of existing infrastructure.
Rank ordering of CO2-emitting assets by committed emissions per dollar value reveals large 
disparities (a; colored by sector). Horizontal red lines in a indicate 50%, 75% and 90% of 
total committed emissions (658 Gt CO2) if operated as historically, and the top ten most 
valuable region-sectors are labeled (see Extended Data Fig. 4 for region-specific versions). 
Plotting emissions per value (kg CO2/$) against committed emissions suggests targeted 
opportunities to “unlock” future CO2 emissions if alternative technologies are affordable 
(region-sectors in the pink-shaded quadrant in b; showing 95% confidence intervals with 
regions denoted by symbols).
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